Jev & risk scoring — Janitor docs

Verified against official documentation on 2026-09-23:

Both transports share createJevInput and parseJevResponse. The full questions and state conversion are in protocol.ts. Three independent yes/no Noul judgments are batched in one request: sameVisitor, automation, suspicious. Noul probabilities are read from noul, not score, value, a generated JSON string, or a chat completion.

Direct TypeSafe

const response = await fetch("https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}`,
    "Content-Type": "application/json",
  },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    model: "jev-latest",
    ...createJevInput({ history, current, deterministicSimilarity }),
  }),
  signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs),
});

The model alias is configurable. JEV_API_KEY is an application/example environment variable; the library receives apiKey explicitly. There is no SDK, retry dependency, or environment lookup inside the library.

Cloudflare Workers AI

const response = await env.AI.run(
  "typesafe/jev",
  createJevInput({ history, current, deterministicSimilarity }),
);

The binding takes { state, questions } directly. It requires no TypeSafe API key and does not receive a direct-API model: 'jev-latest' field. The official REST example instead uses /ai/run with { model: 'typesafe/jev', input: { state, questions } }; that REST wrapper is not used with the binding.

The current model page is under /ai/models/typesafe/jev/, rather than the older guessed /workers-ai/models/jev/ path. The invocation in the original product brief remains correct.

Request and response shapes

{
  state: {
    history: [
      { platform: 'ios', browser: 'safari', timezone: 'Asia/Jerusalem', screen: '390x844', hardwareConcurrency: 6 }
    ],
    current: { /* compact signals and aggregate behavior */ },
    deterministicSimilarity: 0.94,
    evidence: [ /* transparent per-snapshot similarity feature values */ ]
  },
  questions: {
    sameVisitor: { type: 'noul', instructions: '…', criteria: { true: '…', false: '…' } },
    automation: { type: 'noul', instructions: '…', criteria: { true: '…', false: '…' } },
    suspicious: { type: 'noul', instructions: '…', criteria: { true: '…', false: '…' } }
  }
}

Documented response shape (illustrative values):

{
  "model": "jev-1.13.0",
  "answers": {
    "sameVisitor": { "type": "noul", "noul": 0.98 },
    "automation": { "type": "noul", "noul": 0.12 },
    "suspicious": { "type": "noul", "noul": 0.08 }
  },
  "usage": { "input_tokens": 500, "output_tokens": 40 }
}

The parser requires all three Noul types and finite numbers within [0,1]; it does not coerce strings, clamp invalid outputs, or parse prose. Unknown envelopes are treated as unavailable evaluation and fail open in core. Model metadata/usage is not used as identity confidence. Responses are mocked in the test suite; no paid direct Jev or Workers AI inference has been performed as part of repository validation.

Question instructions explicitly treat signal strings as untrusted data. They allow ordinary drift and privacy restrictions, forbid inferring automation from missing mouse movement/APIs alone, and restrict risk to current observations. All identity decisions, thresholds, contradiction guards and persistence remain deterministic code.